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Throughout American history, public officials, religious leaders, 
scholars, and ordinary citizens have debated the proper relationship 
between religion and government. Despite the volume of discussion 
on this topic, a commonly-accepted answer remains elusive-the is- 
sue remains one of the primary wedges dividing the American popu- 
lace. In the past, this debate has centered on taxpayer support for 
religious institutions' and Sunday operation of postal  service^.^ To- 
day, the discussion has shifted to controversies over the display of 
religious symbols on public p r~per ty ,~  the use of school vouchers to 
subsidize religiously-affiliated private  school^,^ and the inclusion of 
"intelligent design" in public school science c~rricula.~ Few of these 
issues have flashed as suddenly into the national consciousness, how- 
ever, as the constitutionality of the words "under God" in the Pledge 
of Allegiance. 
Despite United States Supreme Court dicta alluding to the 
Pledge of Allegiance as unquestionably con~titutional,~ on June 26, 
2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that both the 1954 Act 
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3. See e.g. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. 
Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
4. See e.g. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U . S .  639 (2002); Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers 
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Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676 (1984). 
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of Congress inserting "under G o d  into the Pledge and the state-spon- 
sored recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools violate 
the First Amendment prohibition of laws "respecting an establish- 
ment of religion" (hereinafter "Original Newdow").' The ruling drew 
immediate criticism. According to President George W. Bush's 
spokesperson, "[tlhe president's reaction was that this ruling is ridic- 
ulous."* The President's political foe, Democratic Senate Majority 
Leader Tom Daschle, referred to the decision as "just nuts."9 Senator 
Joseph Lieberman, the Democratic vice presidential nominee in 2000, 
declared: "There may have been a more senseless, ridiculous decision 
issued by a court at some time, but I don't remember it."lo The Ninth 
Circuit subsequently amended its order, limiting the decision to the 
recitation of the Pledge in public schools (hereinafter "Amended 
Newdow")." The Supreme Court eventually overturned this ruling, 
but avoided the substantive legal question by holding that the plain- 
tiff, Michael Newdow, lacked standing to bring the case.12 The sub- 
stantive controversy, however, is far from dead. On September 14, 
2005, a federal judge in the Eastern District of California again found 
the Pledge of Allegiance unconstitutional in a new case brought by 
Mr. Newdow and two other families with children in the California 
public  school^.^" 
The recent litigation surrounding the Pledge of Allegiance, in- 
cluding the Amended Newdow decision, has focused primarily on the 
context in which it is recited-the recitation by school children, led 
by a teacher, in a public school classroom. The litigation's focus on 
state and local government actions requires application of the estab- 
lishment clause beyond the federal government through the due pro- 
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.14 
7. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002). 
8. E.g. David Kravets, 'Under God' Unconstitutional; Appeals Court Rules Phrase in 
. . 
Pledge ~ndorse s  Religion, Chicago Sun-Times 3 (June 27, 2002). 
9. Id. 
10. E.g. Tom Vanden Brook, Critics Say Court was 'California Dreaming, ' USA Today 4A 
(June 27, 2002). 
I I. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003). 
12. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). Mr. Newdow brought this 
case on behalf of his daughter, a student in the Elk Grove Unified School District; the girl's 
mother, however, had sole legal custody. 
13. Newdow v. Cong. of U.S., 383 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (E.D. Cal. 2005). 
14. The First Amendment expressly limits its application to the federal government. U.S. 
Const. amend. I. The first Congress considered and rejected an amendment applying many of the 
First Amendment provisions, but not the establishment clause, to the states: ''no state shall in- 
fringe the equal rights of conscience, nor the freedom of speech or of the press, nor of the right of 
trial by jury in criminal cases." 1 Annals of Cong. 783 (1789). Nonetheless. the Supreme Coun 
has applied most of the Bill of Rights, including the establishment clause and the remainder of the 
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This paper focuses on the text of the Pledge of Allegiance itself, 
as adopted by Congress in federal statute, rather than the context of 
its recitation. Section I examines the history of the Pledge of Alle- 
giance and Congress's insertion of the phrase "under God." Section I1 
investigates the original intent of the establishment clause by analyz- 
ing the text, the legislative history, and the philosophical underpin- 
nings of the Constitution; the federalist structure of the new United 
States government; and historical evidence from the early years of the 
republic. Section 111 applies this interpretation to the 1954 Act of 
Congress adding "under God" to the Pledge of Allegiance and the 
two primary arguments justifying this action. Through this analysis, 
one conclusion becomes apparent: the inclusion of "under G o d  in 
the Pledge of Allegiance is wholly inconsistent with the founding 
generation's understanding, as embodied in the First Amendment es- 
tablishment clause, of the proper relationship between religion and 
the federal government. 
The Pledge of Allegiance was written by Francis Bellamy as a chil- 
dren's recitation for the 400th anniversary of Columbus's discovery of 
America.15 The original language of the Pledge contained no reference to 
either God or the United States.16 In 1923 and 1924, the National Flag Con- 
ference, citing fears that immigrants may confuse the words "my Flag" for 
the flag of their native land, amended the Pledge of Allegiance to reference 
the United States of America.17 Congress first recognized the Pledge of 
Allegiance in 1942 by adding it to the United States Flag Code as part of an 
effort to "codify and emphasize existing rules and customs pertaining to the 
display and use of the flag of the United States of America."18 
First Amendment, to state and local governments through the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Despite this clear 
precedent, however, scholars continue to criticize incorporation. E.g. William K. Lietzau, Redis- 
col~ering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of lncorporation, 39 DePaul L. 
Rev. 1191 (1990). 
15. National Flag Day Foundation, The Story of the Pledge of Allegiance, http://www.flag 
day.org/Pages/PledgeHistory.html (accessed Oct. 24, 2006); Home of Heroes, The Pledge of Alle- 
giance, http://www. homeofheroes.com/hallofheroesl lst~floorlflagl1bfc~pledge.html (accessed 
Oct. 24, 2006). 
16. "I pledge allegiance to my Flag, and to the Republic for which it stands: one Nation 
indivisible, With Liberty and Justice for all." National Flag Day Foundation, supra n. 15; Home 
of Heroes, supra n. 15. 
17. National Flag Day Foundation, supra n. 15; Home of Heroes, supra n. 15. 
18. H.R. Rpt. 77-2047 (Apr. 22, 1942); Sen. Rpt. 77-1477 (June 11, 1942). The codified 
language reflected the changes made by the National Flag Conference in 1923 and 1924: "1 pledge 
allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands, one 
Nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Act of June 22, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-623, 5 7, 
56 Stat. 380 (1942). In 1945, Congress amended the statute to officially designate, rather than 
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In the early 1950s, the Pledge of Allegiance again gained national at- 
tention. On April 22, 1951, the Board of Directors of the Knights of Colum- 
bus adopted a resolution adding the words "under God" to the Pledge of 
Allegiance recited at each of the organization's meetings.19 The following 
year, the Knights of Columbus began adopting resolutions calling for Con- 
gress to formally insert "under God" into the Pledge.20 The effort to amend 
the Pledge of Allegiance gained momentum with a February 1954 sermon 
by the Reverend George M. Docherty endorsing the addition. This service 
was attended by President Dwight Eisenhower and Senator Homer Fergu- 
son, the author of the Senate Congress officially inserted "under 
God" into the Pledge of Allegiance later that year.22 
The two motivating factors cited by Congress clearly manifest the re- 
ligious intent behind the legislation. First, the words "under God" recog- 
nized Congress's belief that America is a religious nation.23 In support of 
this premise, Congress cited several examples of religious references from 
American history, including the 1620 Mayflower Compact, the 1776 Decla- 
ration of Independence, President Abraham Lincoln's 1863 Gettysburg Ad- 
dress, and the 1864 inscription of "In God We Trust" on American coins.24 
Additionally, Congress focused on religion as the fundamental distinction 
between the United States, with a foundation of "individuality and the dig- 
nity of the human being," and "the atheistic and materialistic concepts of 
communism with its attendant subservience of the ind i~ idua l . "~~  President 
simply refer to, the language as the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag of the United States; the text 
of the Pledge itself was not affected. 79 H.R. Rpt. 79-61 1 (May 24, 1945); Pub. L. No. 79-287,59 
Stat. 668 (1945). 
19. Knights of Columbus, How the words "UNDER GOD" came to be added to the Pledge 
of Allegiance to the Flag, http:~www.kofc.orglrc/en~about/activities/community/pledge~llegian~e 
.pdf (accessed Oct. 17,2005); see also Pew Forum on Religion & Pub. Life, Legal Backgrounder: 
One Nation under God? A Constitutional Question, http://pewforum.org/religion-schoolslpledge/ 
backgrounder.pdf (accessed Oct. 17, 2005); David Greenberg, The Pledge of Allegiance: Why 
We're Not One Nation "under God," http://slate.msn.com/?id=2067499 (June 28, 2002). 
20. Knights of Columbus, supra n. 19. 
21. Sen. Rpt. 83-1287 (May 10, 1954); David Greenberg, supra n. 19. 
22. Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 Stat. 249 (1954). This amendment to the 
Pledge of Allegiance brought it to the form we know today: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the 
United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisi- 
ble, with liberty and justice for all." 4 U.S.C. 5 4 (2000). 
23. H.R. Rpt. 83-1693 (May 28, 1954) (reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339) ("From the 
time of our earliest history our peoples and our institutions have reflected the traditional concept 
that our Nation was founded on a fundamental belief in God."); Sen. Rpt. 83-1313 (May 10, 1954) 
("Our forefathers recognized and gave voice to the fundamental truth that a government deriving 
its powers from the consent of the governed must look to God for divine leadership."). 
24. H.R. Rpt. 83-1693; Sen. Rpt. 83-1313. The House committee also cited a report from the 
Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress on the placement of the words to create 
"a fundamental and basic characterization" of the United States as a religious nation. H.R. Rpt. 
83-1693. 
25. H.R. Rpt. 83-1693; Sen. Rpt. 83-1313 (quoting Rev. Docherty: "There was something 
missing in the pledge, and that which was missing was the characteristic and definitive factor in 
the American way of life. Indeed, apart from the mention of the phrase, 'the United States of 
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Eisenhower recognized both of these factors on June 14, 1954 in signing the 
legislation: 
From this day forward, the millions of our school children will 
daily proclaim in every city and town, every village and rural 
school house, the dedication of our nation and our people to the 
Almighty. To anyone who truly loves America, nothing could be 
more inspiring than to contemplate this rededication of our youth, 
on each school morning, to our country's true meaning. . . . In this 
way we are reaffirming the transcendence of religious faith in 
America's heritage and future; in this way we shall constantly 
strengthen those spiritual weapons which forever will be our 
country's most powerful resource in peace or in war.26 
Nearly fifty years after officially inserting "under God," Congress 
again examined the language of the Pledge. Reacting to the Ninth Circuit's 
invalidation of the 1954 statute as an unconstitutional establishment of re- 
ligion, Congress cited the references to God from American history and 
reaffirmed the text of the Pledge of Allegiance, including the words "under 
 GO^."^^ 
In its most basic sense, traditional religious establishment is "the pro- 
motion and inculcation of a common set of beliefs through governmental 
a ~ t h o r i t y . " ~ ~  Although establishment is foreign to most modern Americans, 
the founding generation was knowledgeable and well-acquainted with it: 
"virtually every American-and certainly every educated lawyer or states- 
man-knew from experience what those words meant."29 In Great Britain 
and many of the other European countries from which Americans emi- 
grated, official state religions established by law were common.30 Although 
the American colonies themselves were part of Great Britain and formally 
under the Church of England-colonial charters, the history of religious 
dissent among colonists, and the vast span of the Atlantic Ocean created 
significant diversity in the relationship between colonial governments and 
religious institutions. Nonetheless, nine of the thirteen colonies maintained 
some form of religious establishment at the onset of the Revolutionary 
- 
America,' it could be the pledge of any republic. In fact, I could hear little Moscovites repeat a 
similar pledge to their hammer-and-slckle flag in Moscow with equal solemnity ."). 
26. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill to Include the 
Words "Under God" in the Pledge to the Flag, in Publlc Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1954 563 (Off. of the Fed. Register, Natl. Archives & Recs. Sem., 
Gen. Servs. Admin~stration: U.S. Govt. Prtg. Off. 1960). 
27. Pub. L. No. 107-293, 116 Stat. 2057 (2002). 
28. Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Purt I: 
Establishmerrt of Religion, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2105, 2131 (2003) [hereinafter Establishrrient 
and Disestablishrrient]. 
29. Id. at 2107. 
30. Id. 
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War." The traditional Anglican (Church of England) establishment re- 
mained common in the Southern colonies, while the New England colonies 
adopted a system of multiple local establishments; New York maintained a 
dual establishment of the Anglican and Dutch ch~rches .~ '  As this diversity 
demonstrates, the broad concept of religious establishment permits wide va- 
riation in the breadth and coerciveness of the regulations and in their toler- 
ance for dissenting religious views.33 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits relig- 
ious establishments by the federal government: "Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion."34 As noted above, however, 
religious establishment is a broad concept with varied degrees of govern- 
mental entanglement with religion. Legal scholars and practitioners have 
long debated the proper relationship between the federal government and 
religion under the First Amendment. Although individual perspectives on 
establishment clause analysis span a continuum of interpretations, these 
viewpoints can be divided into four general schools of thought. Some schol- 
ars believe the establishment clause allows federal government interaction 
with religious institutions, even to the point of favoring or disfavoring spe- 
cific religious beliefs, as long as the action does not have "the purpose and 
effect of coercing or altering religious belief or action" (hereinafter 
"nonc~ercion").~~ Another school of establishment clause interpretation fo- 
cuses on preference rather than coercion-the federal government may 
favor religion generally, but may not grant preferential treatment to particu- 
lar religious sects or denominations (hereinafter "n~npreference")."~ Third, 
according to the neutrality perspective, federal government conduct must 
"neither encourager ] nor discourager ] religious belief or practice. . . . [The 
federal government] may not take a position on questions of religion in its 
own speech, and it must treat religious speech by private speakers exactly 
like secular speech by private speakers."37 Finally, strict separationists, fo- 
cusing on Thomas Jefferson's "wall of separation" metaph~r,~"ead the es- 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 21 16-29. 
33. Id. 
34. U.S. Const. amend. I. 
35. Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 933, 940 (198511986) [hereinafter Coercion]. 
36. E.g. Michael J. Perry, What Do the Free Exercise and Notrestabli.shment Norms Forbid? 
Reflections on the Constitutional Law of Religious Freedom, 1 U. St. Thomas L.J. 549, 566 
(2003). 
37. Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments qf Silence: The Equal Status of Religious 
Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1986). 
38. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, in Jefferson & Mudison on 
Sepclratior~ of Church and State 163, 163 (Lenni Brenner ed., Barricade Books 2004). 
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tablishment clause as a prohibition of all governmental interaction with 
religion.39 
A cursory examination of American history may suggest the founding 
generation was not offended by governmental religious speech-a position 
consistent with the noncoercion and nonpreference positions. A deeper 
analysis, however, paints a different picture of the establishment clause, at 
least with respect to the federal government. Interpreting the text in light of 
its legislative history suggests the drafters intended to restrict more than 
religious coercion or preference by the federal government. Moreover, 
many of the philosophical developments of the period and the federalist 
structure of the Constitution, dividing governmental authority between a 
limited national government and the several states, suggest the federal gov- 
ernment was intended to be removed from religious issues. Finally, the his- 
torical evidence, although somewhat ambiguous, supports a broad 
interpretation of the establishment clause. 
Based on this analysis, the original intent of the establishment clause 
prohibits more than the coercion of religious practices or preference of par- 
ticular religious groups-the First Amendment was intended to require offi- 
cial silence by the federal government about religion. 
A. The Text and Legislative History of the First Amendment 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ."40 Although this text, on its 
face, may be interpreted to support any of the four general establishment 
clause perspectives described above, analyzing the text in light of the alter- 
native proposals considered and rejected suggests an intent to prohibit more 
than religious coercion or preference of specific religious groups.41 
The House of Representatives began debating constitutional amend- 
ments on June 8, 1789, when Representative James Madison proposed sev- 
eral amendments for con~iderat ion.~~ These proposals included a first draft 
of the religious liberty clauses: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged 
on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be 
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any man- 
- p~ - - 
39. See Steven K. Green, Of (Utz)equal Jurisprudential Pedigree: Rectlbing the Imbalance 
between Neutralify and Separatiotzism, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 11 11 (2002). 
40. U.S. Const. amend. I. 
41. Professor Douglas Laycock clearly outlined the legislative history of the First Amend- 
ment religion clauses in an article analyzing the constitutionality of financial support for religious 
institutions. Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original 
Inrent, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 875, 878 (198511986) [hereinafter Nonpreferential Aidj. 
42. 1 Annals of Cong. at 440-41, 451-53. Because different printings of the Annals of Con- 
gress have different pagination, the date is the most useful method for finding specific portions of 
the record. Laycock, Nonpreferential Aid, supra n.  41, at n. 27. The version cited throughout this 
paper is available online through the Library of Congress at http://rs6.loc.gov/arnmem/amlaw/ 
1wac.html. 
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ner, or on any pretext, infringed."43 The House of Representatives referred 
all of the proposals to a select ~ommittee.~" 
On August 13, 1789, the House of Representatives resolved itself into 
a committee of the whole to debate the select committee's proposed consti- 
tutional  amendment^.^^ Two days later, on August 15, the House of Repre- 
sentatives began debating the select committee draft of the religious liberty 
clauses: "no religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights 
of conscience be infringed."46 James Madison, responding to concerns that 
the proposal would harm religion, stated he "apprehended the meaning of 
the words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce 
the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any 
manner contrary to their con~cience."~' Madison later proposed amending 
the language to read: "No national religion shall be established by law.""* 
According to Madison, "the people feared one sect might obtain preemi- 
nence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to which they 
would compel others to conform. He thought that if the word 'national' was 
introduced, it would point the amendment directly to the object it was in- 
tended to prevent."49 Madison withdrew his amendment, however, after El- 
bridge Gerry attacked it as an attempt to establish a national, rather than a 
limited federal, g~vernment.~' 
Near the end of the August 15 debate the House of Representatives 
voted, without significant recorded debate, to scrap the select committee 
draft in favor of alternative language proposed by Representative Samuel 
Livermore: "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing 
the rights of con~cience."~~ On August 20, 1789, the House of Representa- 
tives returned to the religious liberty clauses and approved language be- 
tween the narrow restrictions of the select committee draft and the broad 
restrictions proposed by Livermore: "Congress shall make no law establish- 
ing religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of 
conscience be infringed."52 The following day, the House of Representa- 
- - 
43. 1 Annals of Cong. at 45 1. 
44. Id. at 467-68. 
45. Id. at 734. 
46. Id. at 757. 
47. Id. at 758. 
48. Id. (emphasis added). 
49. Id. at 759. 
50. Id. at 758-59. 
51. Id. at 759. 
52. H.R. J., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1789). This is the language reported from the Committee 
of the Whole to the House of Representatives for consideration. The version reported in the An- 
nuls of Congress differs slightly from the one included in the Journal of the House of Representa- 
tives, but the discrepancies are not in the establishment section and do not suhstantively affect the 
meaning of the language. 1 Annals of Cong. at 796; see also Laycock, Nonpreferenrial Aid, supra 
n. 4 1, at 879. 
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tives finally approved and sent to the Senate all of its proposals for constitu- 
tional amendments, including the religious liberty  provision^.^^ 
The Senate began its consideration of the religious liberty clauses with 
the House of Representatives' draft of the language.54 The first proposed 
modification in the Senate clearly reflected the nonpreferential perspective 
of the establishment clause: "Congress shall make no law establishing one 
religious sect or society in preference to others, nor shall the rights of con- 
science be infringed."55 The Senate also considered and rejected, apparently 
for stylistic reasons, two proposed variations equally clear in prohibiting 
only the preference of particular religious groups over others.56 Later that 
day, however, the Senate replaced this unambiguously nonpreferential lan- 
guage with the same establishment and free exercise language-without the 
freedom of conscience language-adopted by the House of 
 representative^.^^ 
A week later, the Senate again considered the religious liberty clauses. 
The Senate, rejecting its previous proposal, adopted and sent to the House 
of Representatives the narrowest version of the establishment clause consid- 
ered: "Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode 
of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion. . . ."58 After the 
House of Representatives rejected this narrow proposal, a conference com- 
mittee produced the language that ultimately became the First 
Amendment.59 
The noncoercion perspective interprets the establishment and free ex- 
ercise clauses as protecting two sides of the same religious liberty right. 
The free exercise clause forbids government proscription; the es- 
tablishment clause forbids government prescription. . . . Thus, a 
broad free exercise right bars government inhibition, deterrence, 
or discrimination; a broad establishment clause right bars relig- 
ious coercion, inducement, or, once again, discrimination-in one 
direction or the other.60 
In support of his noncoercion interpretation of the establishment 
clause, Professor Michael McConnell (now a judge on the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals) cited James Madison's statement during the congres- 
53. H.R. I., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. at 85. 
54. Sen. J., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1789). During the early Congresses, Senate proceedings 
were not open to the public; its debates are therefore not available for review or analysis. Because 
none of the floor debates are available, inferences must be drawn from the Senate action on 
proposals offered and considered. 
55. Sen. J., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. at 70. 
56. Id; see also Laycock, Nonpreferential Aid, supra n. 41, at 880. 
57. Sen. J., 1st Cong., 1 st Sess. at 70. 
58. Id. at 77. 
59. H.R. J., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. at 121; Sen. J., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. at 86-88. 
60. Michael Allen Paulsen, Religion, Equaliry, and the Constitution: Atz Equal Protection 
Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 311, 313-314 (1986). 
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sional debate that he "apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that 
Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation 
of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to 
their conscience" and that he "believed that the people feared one sect 
might obtain a preeminence, or two combine together, and establish a relig- 
ion to which they would compel others to conform."61 This statement, how- 
ever, is irrelevant to understanding the clause; Madison made the statement 
about the select committee draft, which was notably different than the text 
ultimately adopted. 
The noncoercion perspective, in addition to having little support in the 
legislative history, conflicts with generally accepted principles of constitu- 
tional interpretation. Constitutional and statutory provisions are presumed 
to have been added for a purpose; they are not interpreted as meaningless, 
superfluous, or duplicative of other provisions.6' The plain meaning of the 
free exercise clause, however, adequately protects against governmental co- 
ercion of religious belief: "Coercion to observe someone else's religion is 
as much a free exercise violation as is coercion to abandon my own. If 
coercion is also an element of the establishment clause, establishment adds 
nothing to free exercise."63 Thus, the noncoercion interpretation of the es- 
tablishment clause would render the free exercise clause meaningless, con- 
flicting with traditional rules of interpretation. 
This legislative history also suggests the establishment clause was in- 
tended to prohibit more than governmental preference of particular religious 
groups. The select committee language does support the nonpreference per- 
spective-"no religion" allows an inference that "many religions exist, and 
that no one of them may be established by law," especially when compared 
to the hypothetical formulation "[rleligion shall not be established by 
law."64 James Madison's comments during the initial debate and his pro- 
posed addition of the word "national" also support the nonpreference inter- 
pretation. The House of Representatives, during the early discussion of this 
amendment, appeared focused on preventing the creation of a "Church of 
the United States" along the lines of the Church of England. These infer- 
ences in support of nonpreference are destroyed, however, by the House of 
Representatives' abandonment of the select committee language in favor of 
Samuel Livermore's amendment-the broadest establishment language 
considered by either house of Congress. Although the language ultimately 
adopted is clearly narrower than the Livermore proposal, the rejection of 
language unambiguously reflecting the nonpreference perspective suggests 
an intent to prohibit more than the preference of particular religious groups. 
61. McConnell, Coercion, supra n. 35, at 936-37. 
62. E.g. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803). 
63. Laycock, Nonpreferenrial Aid, supra n. 41, at 922. 
64. Id. at 886. 
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The text and legislative history refute the noncoercion and nonprefer- 
ence interpretations of the establishment clause. If the establishment clause 
were only intended to prohibit religious coercion, the establishment clause 
would add nothing to the free exercise clause; such an interpretation con- 
flicts with fundamental principles of constitutional construction. Moreover, 
the express consideration and rejection of language unambiguously embod- 
ying the nonpreference view in favor of broader proposals clearly indicates 
an intention to restrict more than preferences for specific religious groups. 
Thus, the text and legislative history suggest the framers also intended to 
prohibit governmental preference of religion generally. 
B. The Philosophy Underlying the Constitution and ChurcWState 
Relations 
Properly understanding the new theory of government-religion rela- 
tions implicit in the text of the First Amendment requires an analysis of the 
philosophical foundation of the new federal government. Although it is 
clear Americans were far from unanimous in their philosophical and relig- 
ious beliefs, the new governmental structure created by the Constitution 
represents the culmination of several movements redefining the social, po- 
litical, and religious institutions governing human behavior. It is impossible 
to precisely measure the influence of particular beliefs or movements, but 
the influence of some philosophical developments on the new American 
government is evident from the writings of the founding fathers and the text 
of the Constitution itself. 
1 .  Roger Williams 
The first signal of the philosophical shift away from religious estab- 
lishment in America was Roger William's formation of Rhode Island fol- 
lowing his banishment from the Massachusetts Bay colony. Massachusetts 
Bay was founded by Puritans believing themselves "heirs to the ideal of the 
Christian c~mrnonwealth."~~ Like the religious establishments in Europe, 
religion and civil government were fused in the colony.66 Roger Williams, 
however, believed the purity of religion depended on godless g~vernment.~' 
Government is a man-made creation necessary-because of man's sin and 
because God does not directly rule the world-to manage relationships 
among men.68 Thus, the skills of successful governance are wholly unre- 
lated to religious belief: 
We know the many excellent gifts wherewith it hath pleased God 
to furnish many, inabling them for publike service to their Coun- 
65. Kramnick & Moore, supra n. 1 ,  at 47. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 52. 
68. Id. at 54. 
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tries both in peace and war (as all ages and experience testifies) 
on whose soules hee hath not yet pleased to shine in the face of 
Jesus Christ.69 
According to Williams, "government was the business of men, while 
the church was the business of God"-it is blasphemous for a government 
to claim itself Christian or party to a divine contract, and the only way for 
government to promote religion is to ignore it.70 
2. John Locke 
Much of the American Constitution, including the protection of relig- 
ious liberty, was influenced by the political philosophy of John Locke. 
Locke's philosophy centered on a social contract as the sole basis of legiti- 
mate government. Men are naturally in "a state of perfect freedom to order 
their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think 
fit."71 In order to advance peace, safety, and the public men form 
civil governments by granting some of their natural freedom to the commu- 
 nit^.^^ Thus, a commonwealth is "a society of men constituted only for the 
procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests," which in- 
clude life, liberty, health, and property.74 
Responsibility for the salvation of each man's soul belongs exclusively 
to himself-because the salvation of a man's soul requires free belief, this 
authority can not be transferred to the community.75 "[A111 the power of 
civil government relates only to men's civil interests, is confined to the care 
of the things of this world, and hath nothing to do with the world to 
come."76 Churches-"voluntary societ[ies] of men, joining themselves to- 
gether of their own accord, in order to the public worshipping of God, in 
such manner as they judge acceptable to him, and effectual to the salvation 
of their souls7'-are responsible for facilitating man's pursuit of the world 
to come.77 Locke's philosophy, therefore, saw civil government and relig- 
ion as distinct institutions, with distinct spheres of influence, which must be 
strictly separated in order to effectuate the unique function of each. 
John Locke's philosophy on government is apparent from the text of 
the Constitution and the writings of its proponents. The Preamble of the 
69. Id. at 53-54 (quoting Roger Williams). 
70. Id. at 48, 57. 
71. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in Two Treatises of Government and a 
Letter Concerning Toleration 100, 101, 5 4 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale U. Press 2003). 
72. Id. at 156, 5 131. 
73. Id. at 136-37, $ 5  87-88. 
74. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in Two Treatises of Government and a 
Letter Concerning Toleration. supra n. 71 at 21 I. 218. 
75. Id. at 218-219. 
76. Id. at 220. 
77. Id. 
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Constitution clearly states that the authority of the new American govern- 
ment flowed from a social contract between each member of society: 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more per- 
fect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide 
for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure 
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain 
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." 
The Constitution also limited the powers of the new federal govern- 
ment to those expressly granted in the document (and thus granted by the 
people governed by it). These powers include only matters relating to the 
earthly interests of life, liberty, and pr~perty. '~ The Constitution also en- 
sured the new government would remain open to all citizens, without regard 
to religious belief or practice, by stating unambiguously that "no religious 
Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust 
under the United States."" Finally, the influence of Locke's social contract 
theory is apparent from the Federalist Papers." "Nothing is more certain 
than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undenia- 
ble, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it 
some of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite  power^."'^ 
John Locke's writings also played a vital role in the development of 
religious liberty during the founding generation. 
Jefferson carefully read and made notes on Locke's The Reasona- 
bleness of Christianity and his Letters on Religious Toleration. 
Major portions of Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Free- 
dom derived from passages in Locke's first Letter Concerning 
Toleration. Jefferson's bill, in turn, was one of the major precur- 
sors of the religion clauses of the first amendment.8" 
James Madison, a friend and political ally of Thomas Jefferson and the 
primary architect of the Constitution and First Amendment, was a vocal 
advocate for religious liberty and the floor leader for Jefferson's bill in Vir- 
78. U.S. Const. preamble (emphasis added). 
79. U.S. Const. art. I, Q: 8; U.S. Const. amend. IX-X. 
80. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3. 
81. The Federalist Papers were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John 
Jay, and published in the popular press in New York to win support of the Constitution in the 
state's ratifying convention. 
82. The Federalist No. 2 (John Jay), in The Federalist: A Commentary on the Cotistitution of 
the United States 7, 8 (Robert Scigliano ed., The Modem Library 2001); see also The Federalist 
No. I (Alexander Hamilton), in The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United 
States, supra n. 82, at 3 , 3  ("It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to 
the people of this country, to decide by their conduct and example, the important question, 
whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflec- 
tion and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on 
accident and force."). 
83. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1430-31 (1990) [hereinafter Origins and Historical 
Understanding]. 
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ginia's struggle with this issue.84 Writing in support of this bill, Madison 
stated: 
[W]e hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, "that religion 
or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner of dis- 
charging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by 
force or violence." The Religion then of every man must be left to 
the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of 
every man to exercise it as these may dictate.85 
Thus, John Locke's philosophy is an "indispensable part of the intel- 
lectual backdrop" for the framing of the First Amendment religious liberty 
clauses.86 
3. The American Baptists and Other Religious Dissenters 
Baptists and other religious dissenters built upon the religious beliefs 
of Roger Williams and the liberal political philosophy of John Locke. 
Throughout much of the colonial period, religious dissenters were perse- 
cuted in the assessment of religious taxes and in the right to preach and 
practice their religion by the religious establishments in New England and 
the southern colonies.87 During the Great Awakening, traveling preachers 
and revivals led many individuals to abandon the established churches in 
favor of these dissenting religions, leading the established churches to in- 
crease their persecution of religious  dissenter^.'^ 
This persecution led many dissenting religious leaders to the realiza- 
tion that, in order to maintain religious purity and ensure the protection of 
religious liberty, civil government must be separated from religious institu- 
tions. Thus, in addition to supporting the destruction of Virginia's religious 
establishment with Thomas Jefferson's Statute for Religious F r e e d ~ m , ~ ~  
American Baptists were vocal proponents of the inclusion of the no relig- 
ious test clause in the Constitution. The Reverend Isaac Backus, a distin- 
guished Baptist minister, echoed many of Roger Williams' views during the 
Massachusetts ratifying convention: "Nothing is more evident, both in rea- 
son and The Holy Scriptures, than that religion is ever a matter between 
God and individuals; and, therefore, no man or men can impose any relig- 
ious test without invading the essential prerogatives of our Lord Jesus 
Chri~t."~' Reverend Backus also stated, "the imposing of religious tests had 
84. Id. 
85. James Madison, Memorial and Rernonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in Jeffer- 
son & Madison on Separation of Church and State, supra n. 38, at 68. 
86. McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra n. 83, at 1430-31. 
87. Kramnick & Moore, supra n. 1, at 1 13-15. 
88. Id. at 116. 
89. Id. at 119; Thomas Jefferson, Drqji of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, in 
Jefferson & Madison on Separation of Church and State, supra n. 38, at 48. 
90. Kramnick & Moore, supra n. I ,  at 39-40. 
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been the greatest engine of tyranny in the world."g1 The Reverend Samuel 
Langdon repeated similar beliefs at the New Hampshire convention, stating 
that he took "a general view of religion as unconnected with and detached 
from the civil power-that [as] it was an obligation between God and his 
creatures, the civil authority could not interfere without infringing upon the 
rights of cons~ ience . "~~  
4. The Philosophy of ChurcWState Separation 
As the philosophies of Roger Williams, John Locke, and the colonial 
religious dissenters illustrate, the separation of civic government from relig- 
ious institutions serves three important interests: (1) the protection of demo- 
cratic government from religion; (2) the protection of religion from 
government; and (3) the protection of each individual's freedom of 
conscience. 
Separating governmental and religious institutions provides mutual 
protection to both democratic governance and religious doctrine. Although 
most Americans of the founding generation believed that religion, by instil- 
ling morals and preserving a stable public order, was an essential compo- 
nent of a functional civil society,93 religion was historically used as a 
governing tool. By linking governmental policy to the word of God, rulers 
were able to link civil obedience to the religious promise of eternal salva- 
tion or damnation. The new democratic republican government created by 
the Constitution, however, required a new perspective on this link. Relig- 
ion, which is primarily concerned with the word and command of God, 
focuses on absolute moral rights and wrongs. While this is consistent with 
monarchial government, where the king's word is also absolute, it is incon- 
sistent with the compromise necessary for successful republican self-gov- 
ernment in a large population with diverse policy and moral perspectives. A 
strong link between self-government and robust religious institutions would 
require the sacrifice of either effective government or unbiased religion; by 
separating these institutions, both government and religion may be individ- 
ually effective in their distinct spheres. 
Separating religion from the coercive force of government is also nec- 
essary to protect each individual's freedom of conscience. People form re- 
ligious institutions to effectuate the salvation of their souls by worshipping 
God according to the dictates of their individual conscience. This funda- 
mental purpose of religious institutions therefore requires free and honest 
acceptance of religious belief, which is hampered when government influ- 
ences religious choice through coercion or preference of religion. Thus, 
91. Id. at 40. 
92. Id. at 39. 
93. E.g. Steven K. Green, Federalism and the Establishment Clause: A Reassessment, 38 
Creighton L. Rev. 761, 775 (2005). 
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civil government is properly limited to the regulation of interactions among 
individuals to protect their civil, earthly interests. 
When the text of the establishment clause is considered with its philo- 
sophical foundation, it is plain the noncoercion and nonpreference interpre- 
tations crumble. The preference of religion generally exceeds civil 
government's limited legitimate role in governing the earthly affairs of 
men, requires the same compromise of either effective governance or pure 
religion as the preference of particular religious sects, and hampers relig- 
ion's proper function in facilitating the salvation of souls through uncor- 
rupted worship according to each individual's conscience. 
C. The Federal Structure of the New American Government 
The American Constitution utilizes two distinct mechanisms to protect 
individual liberty from the new national government: (1) the governmental 
powers were divided between the new federal government and the govern- 
ments of the several states; and (2) the powers of the federal government 
were divided between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.94 
The first of these mechanisms-federalism-developed from the post- 
Revolution experience under the Articles of Confederation, offered affirma- 
tive liberty protections, and addressed the practical circumstances of the 
era. 
Following the successful Revolution, each of the former colonies be- 
came independent, sovereign states. On March 1, 1781, these individual 
states entered "a firm league of friendship" to address matters of national 
importance under the Articles of C~nfederation.~~ Unlike the subsequent 
Constitution, which derived its authority directly from the citizens under it, 
the national government under the Articles of Confederation existed by 
agreement of the sovereign states.96 The Articles of Confederation, how- 
ever, quickly proved ineffective in addressing the interests of the new 
nation. 
The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Con- 
federation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or 
GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE 
CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDU- 
94. See The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison), in The Federalist: A Commentary on the 
Constitution of the United Stutes, supra n. 82, at 330, 333 ("In the compound republic of America, 
the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then 
the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double 
security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the 
same time that each will be controlled by itself."). 
95. Articles of Confederation an. 111. 
96. Compare U.S. Const. preamble ("We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of America" (emphasis added)) with Articles of 
Confederation art. I11 ("The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with 
each other.' (emphasis added)). 
20061 ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE 645 
ALS of whom they consist. . . . The consequence of this is, that 
though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are 
laws, constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet 
in practice they are mere recommendations which the States ob- 
serve or disregard at their option.97 
To better address the national concerns while continuing to protect in- 
dividual liberty and state sovereignty, the Constitution expands the power 
of the federal government while limiting its authority to the narrow spheres 
of national interest. On issues directly impacting the nation generally (for 
example, national defense and interstate commerce), the Constitution dele- 
gates broad authority to the federal g o ~ e r n m e n t . ~ ~  Over other matters, the 
states retain the governmental authority. 
Assigning governmental authority to the smallest, most local level of 
government able to effectively address the matter protects individual liberty 
by allowing the greatest number of citizens to live according to their per- 
sonal beliefs. This principle is exemplified by religious regulation in the 
early United States. Massachusetts and Virginia utilized dramatically differ- 
ent approaches to rel igi~n. '~ If the central government exercised authority 
to legislate in this sphere, a nationwide majority would be empowered to 
adopt one, or neither, of these distinct approaches. By restricting the central 
government's authority in this sphere and leaving the matter to the several 
states, by contrast, a majority in each individual state could legislate and 
live according to their unique vision. Thus, the First Amendment utilizes a 
dual structure to protect religious freedom-it contains a substantive relig- 
ious liberty provision guaranteeing the free exercise of religion,lM) and a 
structure, as originally understood by the founding generation, to preserve 
this right by reserving religious regulation to the individual states.lO' 
97. The Federalist No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), in The Federalist: A Commentary on the 
Constitution of the United States, supra n. 82, at 85, 89. 
98. E.g. U.S. Const. art. I, 5 8, cl. 1 (federal authority to raise money and pay debts to 
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States), cl. 3 (federal power to 
regulate international and interstate commerce), cl. 11-16 (federal power to declare war, raise an 
army and navy, and call up and train the militia); see also The Federalist Nos. 3, 4 (John Jay), in 
The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States, supra n. 82, at 13-22 
(federal government better suited to avoid hostilities); The Federalist No. I I (Alexander Hamil- 
ton), in The Federalist: A Comrnentary on the Constitution of the United States, supra n. 82, at 
62-69 (federal government better suited to regulate commerce). 
99. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment, supra n. 28, at 21 16-2126. Massachu- 
setts had a system of local establishment, under which each community voted on the church that 
would be the recognized church and receive the funds collected under the religious tax. Virginia, 
by contrast, abolished all religious establishment with Thomas Jefferson's Bill for Establishing 
Religious Freedom in 1786. 
100. U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of 
religion]."). 
101. Id. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."); Lietzau, 
supra n. 14, at 1191-1 194 (proposing this dual structure of religious liberty protection and advo- 
cating the rollback of establishment clause incorporation). 
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In addition to the affirmative protection of religious liberty, the prohi- 
bition of federal religious regulation served important practical considera- 
tions in winning support for the Constitution. America was populated by 
many distinct religious sects and denominations with highly-divergent be- 
liefs about interactions with broader society. At the time of the Constitu- 
tional Convention, states also had several distinct approaches to religious 
regulation. Because of the difficulty in compromising deeply-held, personal 
convictions, such as religious beliefs, and the history of religious persecu- 
tion under the highly-centralized British Empire, the only consensus availa- 
ble in creating an already-controversial federal government was leaving 
religious regulation completely in the hands of the individual states.lo2 
A federalist foundation for the establishment clause is supported by the 
constitutional text and its legislative history. The First Amendment ex- 
pressly applies only to the federal government.'03 While debating proposed 
constitutional amendments, Congress considered and rejected an amend- 
ment applying many of the First Amendment protections to the states: "no 
State shall infringe the equal rights of conscience, nor the freedom of 
speech or of the press, nor of the right of trial by jury in criminal cases."'04 
The rejection of this proposal indicates an intent to leave the regulation of 
these matters to the individual states. The intent to restrain the federal gov- 
ernment, but not the states, from establishing religion is especially clear- 
Congress did not even consider applying a version of the establishment 
clause to the states. 
102. E.g. Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 11 13, 1132-1 134 (1988) ("Given this widespread and deep division, how could Con- 
gress and the ratifying state legislatures have reached agreement on the establishment clause? It 
was supported, after all, both by separationists and by those who were committed to programs of 
state-sponsored religion. These various political actors simply could not have agreed on a general 
principle governing the relationship of religion and government, whether it be the principle en- 
dorsed in Everson [v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)l or any other. If the establishment 
clause had embraced such a principle, it would not have been enacted. What united the representa- 
tives of all the states, both in Congress and in the ratifying legislatures, was a much more narrow 
purpose: to make it plain that Congress was not to legislate on the subject of religion, thereby 
leaving the matter of church-state relations to the individual states. This purpose honored the anti- 
establishment policies of states such as Virginia, but it also protected the existing state establish- 
ments from congressional interference."); Green, supra n. 93, at 767 ("Although the ultimate 
phrasing of the Establishment Clause may indicate the presence of federalism concerns, such was 
not primary or overriding impetus behind the call for or drafting of the First Amendment. Rather, 
the Establishment Clause reflects broad substantive values upon which a majority of early Ameri- 
cans could agree. While those who drafted and ratified the Establishment Clause may have dis- 
agreed over the precise meaning of 'nonestablishment' and its day to day application to issues 
such as days of Thanksgiving or Sabbath laws (in the same way that modem observers diverge 
over issues such as vouchers and the public posting of the Ten Commandments), they shared 
common, broad ideals that found their way into the language of the First Amendment: freedom of 
conscience; no compelled support of religion; no delegation of government authority to religious 
institutions; and equal treatment of all sects."). 
103. U.S Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law. . . ." (emphasis added)). 
104. 1 Annals of Cong. at 783. 
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The federalist interpretation is also consistent with the philosophical 
developments during the founding generation. As noted above, America 
was in the middle of a dramatic philosophical shift away from close ties 
between civil government and religion. While Virginia had already adopted 
the Lockean perspective on religious freedom, as demonstrated in James 
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments'o5 
and the adoption of Thomas Jefferson's Statute for Religious Freedom,lo6 
many New England states retained established churches into the early nine- 
teenth century.'07 The only practical method of protecting existing state 
regulations until the emerging vision of disestablishment and church-state 
separation gained universal acceptance was to leave religious regulation ex- 
clusively to the discretion of the individual states.lo8 
The federalist understanding of the religious liberty clauses supports 
the neutrality interpretation of the establishment clause. Prohibiting only 
federal government coercion or preference of particular sects would not 
completely remove the national government from the religious sphere-the 
governmental preference of religion generally would conflict with states 
adopting the Roger Williams or John Locke philosophies of government- 
religion interaction. Similarly, the strict separation interpretation treats re- 
ligion different than other topics. For the federal government to be com- 
pletely removed from this sphere, it must be blind to religion and treat 
religious speech as it would any other speech. 
Federalism was a central component of America's new government. 
The structure offered affirmative protection of individual liberty by dividing 
governmental authority among multiple political centers. It also allowed 
smaller groups of individuals to each live according to their individual po- 
litical beliefs-even when the policies of different groups conflicted-and 
allowed individual states to serve as laboratories for new policy advances. 
Practically, federalism allowed the several independent states to compro- 
mise on the creation of a new central government by completely removing 
certain issues from the authority of the central government. The establish- 
ment and free exercise clauses are examples of this compromise and affirm- 
ative protection of liberty. The assurance of government neutrality on 
religious questions was necessary to ensure the continued vitality of these 
protections. 
D. America's Early Struggles with ChurcWState Relations 
The governing behavior of the early leaders-many of whom partici- 
pated in the drafting of the text-is also useful in understanding the original 
105. Madison, supra n. 85, at 68. 
106. Jefferson, supra n. 89, at 48. 
107. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment, supra n. 28, at 2126. 
108. E.g. Conkle, supra n. 102, at 1132-34. 
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intent of the religious liberty clauses. This historical evidence, although not 
unanimous, supports the neutrality understanding of the establishment 
clause. 
1 .  The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution 
When the American Constitution was drafted, political documents rou- 
tinely referenced God as the source for the authority and wisdom of the 
government. The Declaration of Independence famously stated: "We hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these 
are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happines~." '~~ The Articles of Confed- 
eration credited "the Great Governor of the W~rld .""~  Most of the early 
state constitutions also overtly acknowledged God and the necessity of 
Christian morality for civil order."' As one critic of the proposed Constitu- 
tion noted, "there was never a nation in the world whose government was 
not circumscribed by religi~n.""~ 
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention, on the other hand, cre- 
ated an intentionally secular Constitution as the foundation of the new fed- 
eral government. In sharp contrast to the typical practices for the period, the 
Constitution makes no religious reference.l13 Such a dramatic departure 
could not have been unintentional; it was also not unnoticed. In 1789, a 
group of religious leaders from New England sent a letter to President 
George Washington, who had presided over the Constitutional Convention, 
"complaining that the Constitution lacked any reference to the only true 
God and Jesus Christ, who he hath sent."'14 Washington replied that "'the 
path of true piety is so plain as to require but little political direction.' Not 
the state and its institutions, . . . but ministers of the gospel were to further 
the 'advancement of true religi~n."'"~ Read together, this evidence 
strongly suggests that the consensus among the framers of the Constitution, 
even if it was not unanimously shared throughout society, was that God was 
intentionally omitted from the Constitution. 
The Constitution was also religiously controversial because the one 
religious provision in the document outlawed religious tests for officers of 
109. Declaration of lrtdeperiderice [¶ 21 (1776). 
110. Articles of Confederation art. XIII, 'j 2. 
1 1  1. Kramnick & Moore, supra n. 1, at 28. 
112. Aristocrotis, The Governmerit o f  Nature Delineated or an Exact Picture of the New Fed- 
eral Constitution, in The Complete Antifederalist vol. 3, 196, 205 (Herbert J. Storing ed., U. of 
Chi. Press 1981). 
113. The Constitution does state: "Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the 
States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven 
hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth." 
U.S. Const. art. VII. This was not a religious statement, however, but a method of measuring 
dates. 
114. Kramnick & Moore, supra n. 1. at 102 (internal quotations omitted). 
115. Id. 
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the federal government."6 This provision was not controversial among del- 
egates to the Constitutional Convention.'17 Among the rest of the country, 
however, the issue was not so clear; eleven of the thirteen states had relig- 
ious tests for public offices in their  constitution^."^ Delegates to ratifying 
conventions across the country expressed concern that this clause would 
open control of the national government to atheists, Catholics, Jews, Mus- 
lims, and Quakers.Il9 Critics viewed the no religious test clause as the em- 
bodiment of a general rejection of Chri~tianity.'~' This criticism led to 
specific proposals to amend the Constitution by adding religious references 
and by requiring a religious test for federal office."' Many Americans also 
spoke out in support of the secular government and no religious test clause. 
These people made religious arguments supporting separation of civil gov- 
ernment from religious  institution^'^^ and practical arguments that the wide 
variety of religious sects in America made religious tests absurd.'23 
The proponents of the secular government ultimately prevailed; the 
Preamble continues to be godless and the no religious test clause remains 
intact. The vigorous debate surrounding these issues clearly demonstrates 
that the founding generation was keenly aware of the arguments in support 
of and in opposition to the secular nature of the proposed federal govern- 
ment and suggests a clear decision to pursue the policy of separation. 
2. The Early Years under the Constit~ition 
During the first twenty years of the new nation, Americans struggled 
to apply the proper relationship between the government and religious insti- 
tutions. One early conflict centered on the issuance of proclamations declar- 
ing days of fasting and thanksgiving. The nation's first two presidents- 
George Washington and John Adams-issued such proclamations without 
controversy.lZ4 Thomas Jefferson-the third president-refused on the 
ground that such proclamations violated the C o n s t i t u t i ~ n . ' ~ ~  Jefferson ex- 
-- 
I 16. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3 ("[Nlo religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to 
any Office or public Trust under the United States."). 
117. Krarnnick & Moore. supra n. I, at 29. According to Maryland delegate Luther Martin, 
the no religious test clause was "adopted by a very great majority of the convention, and without 
much debate." James Madison's notes indicate that only one state voted no and one state delega- 
tion was divided on the question of the no religious test clause. 
118. Id. at 29-30. 
119. Id. at 32. 
120. Id. at 34-37. 
12 1. Id. at 37. 
122. Id. at 39. 
123. Id. at 42. 
124. Id. at 96. 
125. Responding to a request by a group of Baptists in Danbury, Connecticut to declare a day 
of fasting for national reconciliation following his bitter campaign with Adams, Jefferson stated: 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God. 
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate pow- 
ers of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign 
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plained his perspective on the religious liberty clauses in his second inaugu- 
ral address: 
In matters of religion, I have considered that its free exercise is 
placed by the [Clonstitution independent of the powers of the 
general government. I have therefore undertaken, on no occasion, 
to prescribe the religious exercises suited to it; but have left them 
as the [Clonstitution found them, under the direction and disci- 
pline of state or church authorities.lZ6 
The fourth president-James Madison-gave in to political pressures 
surrounding the War of 18 12 and reluctantly made one religious proclama- 
tion, although his draft was crafted as innocuously as possible.12' In 1832, 
well into his retirement, Madison expressed regret he had caved to political 
temptation and issued the p ro~ lamat ion . '~~  
The early ambiguity surrounding the proper relationship between civil 
government and the federal government extended beyond presidential proc- 
lamations. On one hand, Congress appropriated money to pay for missiona- 
ries among the Native Americans. On the other hand, the Senate 
unanimously approved a treaty, apparently with little controversy, 
providing: 
As the government of the United States of America is not in any 
sense founded on the Christian religion-as it has in itself no 
character of enmity against the laws, religion, or tranquility of 
Musselmen [Muslims],- and as the said States never entered into 
any war or act of hostility against any Mahometan [Islamic] na- 
tion, it is declared by the parties that no pretext arising from relig- 
ious opinions shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony 
existing between the two c o u n t r i e ~ . ' ~ ~  
It is not clear whether any inferences may be drawn from these govern- 
mental actions. In appropriating money for missionaries, Congress may 
have been purchasing civil services; religious actors were generally the only 
providers of education and social services in early America. Likewise, any 
insight into the founders' mindset on the relationship between the federal 
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature 
should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between Church and State. 
Jefferson, supra n. 38, at 163. 
126. Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address, in Jefferson & Madison on Separation of 
Church and State, supra n. 38, at 178. 
127. Kramnick & Moore, supra n. 1, at 105-06. After declaring war with Great Britain in 
1812, Congress requested a national day of fasting "with religious solemnity as a day of public 
humiliation and prayer." Id. at 105. Madison eventually acceded and issued such a proclamation 
on July 23, 1813. See James Madison, A Proclamation of Thanksgiving, in Jefferson & Mudison 
on Separation of Church and State, supra n. 38, at 207. 
128. Kramnick & Moore, supra n. 1, at 106. 
129. Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the United States of America and the Bey and 
Subjects of Tripoli of Barbary art. XI (Nov. 4, 1796, ratified June 7, 1797), available at http:// 
www.yale.edu/lawweblavalonldiplomacyhrbaryar1796t.htm (accessed Oct. 14, 2006). 
20061 ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE 65 1 
government and religion from the Senate's unanimous passage of a declara- 
tion that the United States is not "founded on the Christian religion" is 
tempered by the context of the statement in a peace treaty with a nation 
founded on another religion. Finally, these controversies were relatively mi- 
nor and not sufficiently contentious to engage the nation in a broad debate 
about the proper relationship between civil government and religious 
institutions. 
3. The Sunday Mail Debates 
The nation did become embroiled in a broad debate about the secular 
nature of the federal government when the local postmaster of a small 
Pennsylvania town was expelled from his church for opening the post office 
for a few hours on Sundays as a convenience for churchgoers from neigh- 
boring ~ i 1 l a g e s . l ~ ~  In 1810, Congress responded with legislation requiring 
the daily (including Sundays) transportation of mail and operation of every 
post office.'" Congress was immediately inundated with petitions stating 
the statute made "it necessary to violate the command of God" and "His 
justice will demand that adequate punishment be initiated on our common 
country."'32 Postal officials argued that frequent mail movement was essen- 
tial to the nation's economy and national defense.'" This initial skirmish 
over Sunday postal operations was ultimately won by those supporting a 
secular federal government-although opponents attempted to repeal the 
1810 law, the legislation died in 1817 without being brought to a vote. 13" 
A new campaign to stop Sunday postal operations began with the crea- 
tion of the General Union for the Promotion of the Christian Sabbath in 
May 1828.'" Learning from the earlier failure based on commercial con- 
siderations, the group organized merchants who supported their cause'36 
and required members to boycott companies carrying mail on sun day^.'^^ 
The petitions that supported repeal of the law made both anti-federalist13' 
and r e l i g i o u ~ ' ~ ~  arguments. Proponents of Sunday mail delivery, rather than 
relying solely on commercial considerations as they had in the earlier strug- 
gle, focused on the secular nature of the federal government. This was em- 
130. Kramnick & Moore, supru n. I, at 132. 
131. Id. at 133. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 134. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 135. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. The postal service contracted with passenger canying companies to transport mail. Id. 
at 134. 
138. Id. at 136 ("The general Government has not the constitutional power to authorize viola- 
tion of the Sabbath."). 
139. Id. (The United States is "a Christian Community, where all the chartered rights and 
political institutions, as well as the legislative provisions of the country, recognize the authority of 
the Christian religion."). 
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bodied in a report by General Richard M. Johnson, chair of the Senate 
Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads, entitled Report on the Sub- 
ject of Mails on the Sabbath.14' General Johnson's report focused on the 
unconstitutionality of " 'the principle that the Legislature was a proper tribu- 
nal to determine what are the laws of God"' because Congress is "a civil 
institution, wholly destitute of religious a~thority."'~' The report continued: 
"The framers of the Constitution recognized the eternal principle that man's 
relation with God is above human legislation and his rights of conscience 
~nal ienable ." '~~ The federal government lacks the authority to "define God 
or point out to the citizen one religious duty," including recognition of the 
Sabbath.'43 
Advocates of a separation between government and religion were ini- 
tially successful in preserving Sunday mail delivery. Ultimately, however, 
new technologies eroded the necessity of Sunday mail service; in 1912, 
Congress officially closed all post offices on Sunday.144 
4. Understanding America's Early History of Religious Separation 
The history, although not definitive, suggests the founding generation 
intended to create a secular federal government and interpreted the Consti- 
tution as prohibiting religious coercion, the preference of particular relig- 
ious groups, and the preference of religion generally. This history also 
suggests the founding generation did not intend a strict separation where the 
government merely places religion on an equal footing with nonreligious 
beliefs or speech. 
Thomas Jefferson was one of the founding generation's most vocal 
and most principled advocates of church-state separation. At first glance, 
his reliance on God in the Declaration of Independence as the source of the 
"unalienable rights" appears entirely inconsistent with his separationist 
principles. This understanding, however, does not properly account for the 
Lockean philosophy or practical differences between the Declaration of In- 
dependence and the Constitution. Jefferson, like Locke, was personally re- 
ligious and believed that God was the source of human rights.'45 Both men 
140. Id. at 138-39. 
141. Id. at 139 (quoting Johnson). 
142. Id. at 140. 
143. Id. at 141 (internal quotations omitted). 
144. Id. at 142. 
145. See Locke, Second Treatise of Government, supra n. 71, at 101, 5 4 ("there being nothing 
more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same 
advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another 
without subordination or subjection; unless the Lord and Master of them all should, by any mani- 
fest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear 
appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty."); Declaration of Independence [q[ 
21 (1776) ("We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and 
the Pursuit of Happiness."). 
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also believed that religion was intensely personal and outside the sphere of 
legitimate government a ~ t h 0 r i t y . l ~ ~  Thus, incorporating religious principles 
into the Declaration of Independence-a persuasive, rather than governing, 
document justifying the American independence movement and focused on 
winning the support of colonists and foreign governments--was entirely 
appropriate. The Constitution, however, was a document establishing and 
setting the boundaries for a civil government, and religious references 
would be inappropriate to adherents of Locke's philosophy on church-state 
separation. 
America's early history includes two major national debates about the 
proper interaction between government and religious institutions and sev- 
eral instances of minor political actions that do not reflect consistent princi- 
ples on the subject. America represented an experiment applying the still- 
developing philosophy of religious liberty through church-state separation. 
The minor actions of the early republic suggest a nation struggling to apply 
its philosophical principles to real-world governance. In the two instances 
in which the national attention was focused on the issue, America chose 
governmental neutrality toward religion generally. In both the constitutional 
ratification and the Sunday mail debates, America rejected attempts to link 
religion and government in circumstances that would not have coerced re- 
ligious practice or preferred any of the particular Christian sects. When the 
national attention was elsewhere, however, the governing behavior lapsed 
from the constitutional neutrality principles toward the traditional church- 
state connection present throughout the founding generation's previous ex- 
perience. This hypothesis is supported by James Madison's issuance of the 
Thanksgiving proclamation: when the nation was focused on war with En- 
gland, Madison's religious liberty principles bowed; when he later reflected 
on his action, however, he realized his error. 
These lapses favor a government neutrality construction over a strict 
separation view of the establishment clause. Strict separation draws a 
bright, easy-to-follow line: government may not act in any way touching 
religion. Government neutrality, in contrast, requires greater thought be- 
cause some actions that touch religion without prefemng it are allowed. If 
government actions were uncontroversial, officials would have to specifi- 
cally remember to analyze the establishment clause implications; where this 
was not done, actions violating the neutrality principle could escape notice. 
The history of some governmental action touching religion suggests all 
such relationships were not offensive to the First Amendment's drafters. 
146. See Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, supra n. 74,  at 219 ("Nor can any power be 
vested in the magistrate by the consent of the people; because no man can so far abandon the care 
of his own salvation as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other, whether prince or subject, to 
prescribe to him what faith or worship he shall embrace."); Kramnick & Moore, supra n. 1, at 96. 
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E. Defining the Boundaries of Interaction between the Federal 
Government and Religion under the Establishment Clause 
The drafters and ratifiers of the establishment clause undertook an 
original experiment-the protection of religious liberty through the separa- 
tion of religion from civil government. As the world's first modem demo- 
cratic republic, civil government needed protection from uncompromising 
religious principles. The long history of religious establishments also 
demonstrated the need to protect religious doctrine from political corruption 
and to protect the individual right, and responsibility, to practice religion 
according to one's own conscience. Finally, the practical reality in the 
adoption of the Constitution required that, at least until the philosophy of 
separation fully emerged throughout the nation, the exclusive authority to 
regulate within the religious sphere be left to the individual states. 
Professor Michael Perry defines the nonestablishment norm, inherent 
in the establishment clause, as prohibiting government from acting "for the 
purpose of favoring any church in relation to any other church on the basis 
of the view that the favored church is, as a church, as a community of faith, 
better along one or another dimension of value-truer, for example, or 
more efficacious spiritually, or more authentically A m e r i ~ a n . " ' ~ ~  This defi- 
nition has one fundamental flaw-the First Congress unambiguously con- 
sidered, and rejected, the nonpreference view. According to the original 
understanding of the establishment clause, government is prohibited from 
favoring both specific religious groups and religion generally. Modifying 
Professor Perry's definition to reflect this original intent, the establishment 
clause prohibits government actions from preferring any religion over an- 
other religion, or over no religion at all, on the basis that the favored relig- 
ious belief is better along one or another dimension of value-for example, 
truer, more efficacious spiritually, or more authentically American. 
The original intent of the establishment clause thus required official 
government silence on religious matters. The government may not write 
religious beliefs into the text of any statute or into any findings or policies 
supporting a statutory policy. Even general religious references necessarily 
exhibit preference for, and place the official government stamp on, religion 
itself. 
Prohibiting government speech that takes positions on religious 
questions prevents these private speakers from bringing govern- 
ment power to bear in their efforts to persuade or convert; pro- 
tects all views about religion from having to compete with the 
power of government promoting some other view; protects every- 
one from being coerced or manipulated into attending religious 
observances they would not freely choose to attend; and in gen- 
147. Perry, supra n. 36, at 566. 
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eral, prevents government from either encouraging or discourag- 
ing any religious belief or practice.14' 
It is undoubtedly true that religious rationales were written into many 
statutes in early America-even Thomas Jefferson, the most separationist 
of the founding fathers, cited a religious foundation for his famous Statute 
for Religious Freedom: "Almighty God hath created the mind free, and 
manifested his supreme will that free it shall remain by making it altogether 
insusceptible of restraint."149 This example, however, merely demonstrates 
the emerging nature of the separation philosophy. Jefferson's statute was 
drafted and adopted years before the establishment clause. To take a princi- 
pled stand refusing to use the primary tools of the period, without the agree- 
ment of all political actors, would only ensure defeat. Effective reformers 
must use the tools of the existing system to change the existing system. 
While the First Amendment requires official government silence, it 
does not require complete separation. Congress may not write religious 
motivations into the United States Code. Individual members of Congress, 
however, may discuss their personal religious beliefs in connection with 
any political issue without offending the First Amendment. These state- 
ments are no different from any other motivations for specific policy deci- 
sions, and represent the voice of the individual rather than the government. 
Balancing of official government silence with individual freedom of 
speech, even when the speaker is an elected official, ensures that govern- 
ment does not influence individual religious choice by preventing any relig- 
ion from becoming the official or unofficial religion of the nation. 
The establishment clause was drafted to prohibit federal government 
actions that prefer any religion over any other religion, or over no religion 
at all, based on the view that the favored religious belief is better along one 
or another dimension of value (for example, that the religious belief is truer, 
more efficacious spiritually, or more authentically American).lso This pro- 
vision, at a basic level, requires official federal government silence on all 
religious matters. By inserting the words "under God" into the Pledge of 
Allegiance in federal statute, the United States Congress violated the origi- 
- - pp 
148. Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Lib- 
erty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 Ham. L. Rev. 155, 218-19 (2004) [here- 
inafter The Pledge of Allegiance]. 
149. Thomas Jefferson, Drafr of the Virginia Statute for Religrous Freedom, in Jefferson & 
Madison on Separation of Church and State, supra n. 89. The second clause of this quote was 
deleted from the version ultimately adopted by the Virginia Assembly in 1786. 
150. See supra at $ 1I.E. 
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nal understanding of the establishment clause by exhibiting a preference of 
particular religious beliefs and of religion generally. 
Proponents of the continued iiiclusion of "under God" in the Pledge of 
Allegiance rely on two primary justifications to overcome this constitu- 
tional violation: (1) that "under God" does not really have a religious mean- 
ing in the context of the Pledge of Allegiance; and (2) that the phrase is a 
legitimate recognition of the limited authority of the federal government. 
The first justification ignores the history and context of the words; the sec- 
ond is contradicted by the Lockean social contract philosophy underlying 
the Constitution. Thus, neither justification cures the phrase's plain viola- 
tion of the original understanding of the establishment clause. 
A. Congress's 1954 Addition of "under God" to the Pledge of 
Allegiance Exhibits Federal Governmental Preference of 
Specijic Religious Values, and of Religion Generally, as 
Authentically American 
The plain meaning of the words "under God" includes three facets of 
religious doctrine. First, the words are a statement that there is a God-a 
most basic, and most fundamental, religious belief. Second, the singular 
"God" is a statement there is only one God. Finally, the words define one 
aspect of the nature of God-stating that the nation is under God implies 
that God endorses and exercises supervisory authority over it. Thus, the two 
simple words embody governmental preference for religion over atheism or 
agnosticism, monotheist religions over polytheist religions, and the belief in 
an active God over the belief in a passive Creator.15' Inserting the words 
"under God" into the Pledge of Allegiance exhibits Congress's religious 
preference by equating the three implicit religious doctrines with authentic 
American values. The Pledge of Allegiance is an affirmation of personal 
loyalty to the United States and its most fundamental characteristics. "To 
recite the Pledge is . . . to swear allegiance to the values for which the flag 
stands: unity, indivisibility, liberty, justice, and-since 1954-monothe- 
ism.fl152 By adding religious doctrine to this list of fundamental characteris- 
tics, the Pledge forces atheists and agnostics, polytheists, and citizens who 
believe in a passive God into an impossible choice: be perceived as an in- 
ferior, disloyal citizen; become a hypocrite by reciting false beliefs; or con- 
form to the congressionally-sanctioned religious doctrine. 
The legislative history of the 1954 Act unequivocally demonstrates 
Congress's intent to link religious doctrine with authentic American values. 
In support of the legislation, Congress stated, "our Nation was founded on a 
fundamental belief in God."lS3 Congress also cited religious belief as the 
1.51. Laycock, The Pledge of Allegiance, supra n. 148, at 226. 
152. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 607. 
1.53. H.R. Rpt. 83-1693; see also Sen. Rpt. 83-1313. 
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distinguishing characteristic between America's core principles and Com- 
munism, thus making this one value the most authentically A m e r i ~ a n . ' ~ ~  In 
signing the bill, President Eisenhower described the new law as "the dedi- 
cation of our nation and our people to the Almighty," and stated that, "[tlo 
anyone who truly loves America, nothing could be more inspiring than to 
contemplate this rededication . . . to our country's true meaning."'" Con- 
gress thus explicitly sought to link monotheistic religious belief in an active 
God with the duties of a patriotic American citizen through this legislation. 
B. In Arguing that "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance is 
Historical or Ceremonial, Rather than Religious, Proponents of 
the Phrase Ignore the Plain Legislative History and the 
Context of the Pledge of Allegiance 
Many defenders of "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance argue the 
phrase is historical or ceremonial, rather than religious. Some argue the 
phrase "merely recognize[s] the historical fact that our Nation was believed 
to have been founded 'under God."'156 Others believe the words represent 
ceremonial deism-religious references "serv[ing], in the only ways rea- 
sonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes of solem- 
nizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and 
encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in soci- 
ety."15' Such references are "protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny 
chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any significant relig- 
ious content."'58 
The historical and ceremonial justifications ignore the legislative his- 
tory of the 1954 Act inserting "under G o d  into the Pledge of Allegiance. In 
passing this legislation, Congress did cite a long list of religious refer- 
ences-from the 1620 Mayflower Compact through the 1864 inscription of 
"In God We Trust" on American coins-to support a claim that America 
was founded on Christian pr in~ip1es . l~~ The remainder of the legislative 
history, however, reveals Congress's true intention-to portray the United 
States as presently characterized by, not historically founded upon, Chris- 
tian principles. "Under G o d  was added to the Pledge of Allegiance at the 
height of the Cold War because Congress believed America's religious 
character was its fundamental difference with "the atheistic and materialis- 
tic" Communism of the Soviet Union.160 As President Eisenhower recog- 
nized in signing the legislation: 
154. H.R. Rpt. 83-1693; see also Sen. Rpt. 83-131 3. 
155. Eisenhower, Statement by the President upon Signing Bill to Include the Words "Under 
God" in the Pledge to the Flag, supra n. 26, at 563. 
156. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 304 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
157. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984). 
158. Id. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
159. H.R. Rpt. 83-1693; Sen. Rpt. 83-1313. 
160. H.R. Rpt. 83-1693; Sen. Rpt. 83.1313. 
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From this day forward, the millions of our school children will 
daily proclaim in every city and town, every village and rural 
school house, the dedication of our nation and our people to the 
Almighty. To anyone who truly loves America, nothing could be 
more inspiring than to contemplate this rededication of our youth, 
on each school morning, to our country's true meaning. . . . In this 
way we are reaffirming the transcendence of religious faith in 
America's heritage and future; in this way we shall constantly 
strengthen those spiritual weapons which forever will be our 
country's most powerful resource in peace or in war.161 
Thus, the legislative history contradicts the argument that "under God" 
merely recognizes the historical fact of America's purported religious foun- 
dation and that the words are ceremonial and lack religious meaning-the 
words were inserted precisely because of their statement of the United 
States' present religious character. 
The historical and ceremonial justification also ignores the context of 
the words. Some religious references, such as the use of "in the Year of our 
Lord" to date the Constitution, do not have a religious meaning.'62 Many of 
the other historical examples cited, including the Declaration of Indepen- 
dence and Gettysburg Address, were not statements made by the govern- 
ment in its official capacity, and therefore do not violate the principle of 
governmental ne~ t ra1 i ty . l~~  In a dissenting opinion of the Amended 
Newdow opinion, Judge O'Scannlain writes: "Most assuredly, to pledge al- 
legiance to flag and country is a patriotic act. . . . The fact the Pledge is 
infused with an undoubtedly religious reference does not change the nature 
16 1. Eisenhower, Statement by the President upon Signing Bill to Include the Words "Under 
God" in the Pledge to the Flag, supra n. 26, at 563. 
162. The use of "in the Year of our Lord" was the customary method of counting years in 
colonial America. This system was introduced by Dionysius Exiguus, a Scythian monk, in about 
527. He designated years based upon his calculation of the year of Christ's birth. The years fol- 
lowing this date are designated Anno Domini (latin for "In the Year of the Lord"), which is 
commonly abbreviated as A.D. This system of chronology spread across Europe, with England 
among the first areas to adopt its use-this system was found in Saxon texts dating to the seventh 
century. In western society, including mathematical and scientific communities, the use of A.D. 
continues to be the widely accepted method of counting years. See John Gerard, Chronology, 
General, I11 Catholic Encyclopedia 738 (Charles G. Herbermann et al. eds., Robert Appleton Co. 
1908). There are many non-religious reasons for adopting a uniform system of dating and chronol- 
ogy, even a uniform system utilizing a religious reference. For example, the British Parliament 
recognized many of these reasons in switching from the Julian to the Gregorian calendar in 175 1, 
including: (1) "frequent Mistakes . . . occasioned in the Dates of Deeds, and other Writings," and 
(2) the "general Convenience to Merchants, and other Persons corresponding with other Nations 
and Countries." British Calendar Act, 1751, 24 Geo. 2 c. 23 (Eng.). The triumph of uniformity 
over religious principle in this area is demonstrated by the British adoption of the Gregorian 
calendar, which was introduced by Pope Gregory XIII, despite the religious conflict between 
Great Britain and the Roman Catholic Church. 
163. The Declaration of Independence was drafted as a persuasive document to gain the sup- 
port of colonists and foreign governments. The Gettysburg Address was a speech by an individual 
member of the government, not a statement by the government acting through its governing 
power. 
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of the act itself."164 It is precisely this point-the inclusion of religious 
doctrine in an officially-sanctioned, personal affirmation of patriotism and 
obedience to the nation and its core values-that offends the original inten- 
tion of the establishment ~ 1 a u s e . l ~ ~  The words, as written in the statute, 
require the reciter to pledge allegiance to "one Nation under God," not to 
"one Nation founded by religious believers9'-if we do not accept the plain 
meaning of the words in the Pledge of Allegiance, what value does it have 
as a loyalty oath or patriotic exercise? 
C. Although the Power of the Federal Government is Constitutionally 
Limited, the American People, Not God, are the Recognized 
Limiting Force 
Professor Thomas Berg offers an alternative rationale supporting the 
inclusion of "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance-the phrase 
expresses the idea that government is a limited institution, subject 
to standards of authority higher than itself. "Under God" ex- 
presses the idea that the rights of persons-the "liberty and jus- 
tice" guaranteed to all-are inalienable, stemming from a source 
higher than the nation or any other human a ~ t h 0 r i t y . l ~ ~  
The phrase is permissible, maybe even necessary, because it recog- 
nizes "a religious rationale for the ideal of limited government and inaliena- 
ble rights."16' 
The first premise of this rationale is correct-the United States govern- 
ment, under the Constitution, is limited and subject to a higher authority. 
This higher authority, however, is not God. The drafters of the Constitution 
were well-acquainted with government "constrained" by God-centuries of 
European monarchs ruled under the divine right of kings, which theorized 
that monarchs derived their authority directly from God,'68 and did not rec- 
ognize limited government or inalienable rights. The new American gov- 
ernment was based on a new political theory-John Locke's social contract 
theory. Government is created by men for their mutual benefit, and is sub- 
ject to their continued consent to be governed. The Constitution itself rec- 
164. Newdow, 328 F.3d at 478 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
165. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in the Original Newdow decision: 
The recitation that ours is a nation 'under God' is not a mere acknowledgment that many 
Americans believe in a deity. Nor is it merely descriptive of the undeniable historical 
significance of religion in the founding of the Republic. Rather, the phrase 'one nation 
under God' in the context of the Pledge is normative. To recite the Pledge is not to 
describe the United States; instead, it is to swear allegiance to the values for which the 
flag stands: unity, indivisibility, liberty, justice, and-since 1954-monotheism. 
Newdow, 292 F.3d at 607 (9th Cir. 2002). 
166. Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 
41, 52 (2003). 
167. Id. at 67. 
168. E.g. Edward Rubin, The Conceptual Explanation for Legislative Failure, 30 L. & Soc. 
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ognizes this source of its authority: "We the People of the United States . . . 
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of 
America."' h9 The American people-not God-are the higher authority and 
the limit on the authority of the federal government. Thus, this rationale 
cannot support the inclusion of religious doctrine in the Pledge of 
Allegiance. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As originally understood, the establishment clause removes the federal 
government from the religious sphere-it prohibits federal government ac- 
tions that prefer any religion in relation to any other religion, or in relation 
to no religion at all, on the basis of the view that the favored religious belief 
is better along one or another dimension of value (e.g. that the religious 
belief is truer, more efficacious spiritually, or more authentically Ameri- 
can). This interpretation is supported by the constitutional text and legisla- 
tive history, the philosophical foundation of the Constitution, the federal 
structure of the new government, and the historical practice of our early 
leaders. Despite considering alternative proposals unambiguously adopting 
other establishment clause int,erpretations, such as noncoercion and non- 
preference, the first Congress adopted the relatively expansive text of the 
First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion." In crafting the new Constitution, the founding generation was 
greatly influenced by the philosophies of Roger Williams and John 
Locke-civil government is created by men to govern man's earthly behav- 
ior, and must be separated from religious institutions so that each may ef- 
fectively perform its unique function. By separating the federal government 
from religion, the drafters also implemented an important structural safe- 
guard of religious liberty-allowing more citizens to live according to their 
personal convictions-and found a workable compromise for a highly-con- 
tentious issue. Finally, the actions of America's early leaders demonstrate 
that, when the nation's attention was focused on the proper relationship 
between government and religion, the nation repeatedly chose separation. 
The continued vitality of the Constitution requires strict adherence to 
its requirements, regardless of popular opinion and short-term political ex- 
pedients. In 1954, Congress adopted legislation inserting the words "under 
God" into the Pledge of Allegiance. In this context, the words are not 
merely historical, ceremonial, or meaningless, and do not represent the con- 
stitutional limit on the authority of the federal government-they attempt to 
link specific religious doctrine with America's core values. By adopting this 
legislation, Congress thus broke America's long constitutional tradition of 
secular government. 
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